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Recent Developments
in Malaysia
What's
going on?
Basically,
many informed
observers seem to think that
Dr Mahathir decided Anwar could
no longer be trusted
to protect Dr Mahathir's
interests anymore, especially
after Dr Mahathir is no longer
PM. the transcript
Why
do you say that?
Dr
Mahathir was certainly not too
pleased with various things
Anwar did from mid-1997. When
Dr Mahathir went away for two
months, Anwar gave the impression
that he was going to be tougher
on corruption. Then after Dr
Mahathir took over economic
policy after his return, the
foreign media began mocking
his conspiratorial analysis,
generally running him down and
promoting the idea of an early
Anwar succession. From the end
of the year, Anwar seemed to
take over economic policy, cutting
government spending, raising
interest rates and tightening
liquidity, which arguably exacerbated
the crisis and took the economy
into recession in 1998, especially
after the Kongsi Raya holiday
reprieve.
But I think the straw which
broke the camel's back
came around late May or in June,
with developments in Indonesia
and the subsequent adoption
of the reformasi slogan and
the anti-KKN (corruption, cronyism,
nepotism) campaign by the UMNO
Youth leadership then, who were
close to Anwar. I don't
think Dr Mahathir minded attacking
korupsi and kronisme, but nepotisme
came too close to the bone.
Several months earlier, PRM
president Dr Syed Husin Ali
and a couple of associates had
asked the Anti-Corruption Agency
(ACA) to investigate how Dr
Mahathir's three sons
had gained stock in over two
hundred companies by late 1994.
Soeharto's resignation
on 21 May and the continued
attacks on the ex-president
who had only recently joined
the ranks of Forbes magazine's
richest men in the world - after
the Sultan of Brunei and Bill
Gates – must have upset
Dr Mahathir even though there
are important differences between
the two.
But
the charges against Anwar were
raised earlier at the 1997 UMNO
general assembly?
I
am not sure; many believe that
some of Anwar's enemies
had hatched up the ‘plot'
to finish off Anwar politically
before that, but Dr Mahathir
still felt Anwar was the Prime
Minister's least problematic
option then, and was not yet
willing to go along with them
at that point.
So
you agree with those in Dr Mahathir's
camp that Anwar was going for
number one?
Perhaps.
I don't know, but if Anwar's
camp was making a bid, it was
naïve, ill-considered and
bound to fail. As I said earlier,
Dr Mahathir is not Soeharto.
He will go with his boots on.
I don't believe that he
was about to quit, to give way
to Anwar. Besides wanting to
cling on to power for all the
usual reasons, I think Dr Mahathir
honestly believes that he is
the best thing Malaysia has
ever had and could hope for,
and many would agree with him.
If
Anwar was not going for number
one, what was happening?
There
were Anwar's critical
Johor speech, the unevenly attended
Pemuda economic convention a
couple of weeks before the late
June general assembly and Zahid's
speech at the UMNO Youth assembly
itself. Anwar's assembly
speech did not criticise Mahathir
at all, and in fact announced
a U-turn from his December 1997
economic policy, by increasing
government spending and liquidity
and trying to lower interest
rates, almost as if in response
to Daim's and Dr Mahathir's
earlier criticisms.
Others Anwar had consulted had
voiced similar concerns as well.
Maybe he was keeping his cards
very close to his chest, but
Anwar did not respond positively,
for example, to those who called
for him to ‘lead us out
of this darkness' and
even went out of his way to
explain Mahathir's concerns.
There is little evidence of
any serious effort by Anwar's
camp to mobilise forces and
resources to actually try to
oust Dr Mahathir. Pointed criticism
of nepotism, yes, but a effective
plan or strategy to oust Mahathir,
unlikely. And if there was one,
it was terribly amateurish and
bound to fail. But whatever
it was, it was enough to convince
Dr Mahathir that Anwar was out
to replace him.
How did Dr Mahathir respond?
Dr
Mahathir was very cool. I saw
him smiling proudly at the St
Petersburg Orchestra's
concert at the Petronas Philharmonic
Concert Hall the night before
he delivered his devastating
rounding-up speech and released
the partial lists of tender,
contract and privatisation beneficiaries
from the Economic Planning Unit
(EPU) and the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI), all
of which reflected sound preparation.
And then?
Although
it was later evident that a
purge of Anwar's camp
had begun, beginning with the
media, I thought that Dr Mahathir
had Anwar exactly where Dr Mahathir
wanted Anwar - weakened, compliant
and constrained from mounting
an effective challenge. I wrongly
thought Dr Mahathir would prefer
the safety of such an arrangement
rather than risk an Anwar challenge
by sacking him or forcing him
to resign.
So why the subsequent turn of events?
Probably,
in their calculations, Anwar's
only real strength is his popularity
based on his personal charisma
and moral standing. There is
nothing much one can do about
his charisma, hence the need
to destroy his reputation. Given
the reputations of many ministers
in this country, straightforward
adultery or something in that
league would not be good, or
rather, bad enough to damage
Anwar irreparably.
Thus, the need for something
truly scurrilous or scandalous
in the form of the sodomy allegations
given the presumed homophobia
in our society. At first, in
the earlier version which came
out with the surat layang at
the 1997 assembly, the allegations
seemed plausible.
But as Anwar covered himself,
by the time the book came out,
the charges against Anwar had
begun to overload. They eventually
made so many allegations, probably
making them up as they went
along, in the hope that most
people would believe at least
some of them, and at least a
few of them would stick and
do the necessary damage.
So has it worked?
Partly
perhaps, but certainly not as
intended. They have been their
own worst enemies. Their flagrant
disregard for at least nominally
complying with accepted procedure
has shocked even those usually
blissfully insensitive to such
matters. With the benefit of
hindsight, some now argue that
Dr Mahathir should instead have
first charged Anwar, then eased
him out of government and the
party.
Whatever the reasons for the
particular sequence adopted,
it backfired.
What do you mean by backfiring?
J:
As what happened began to sink
in, popular support for Anwar
quickly picked up. Yet, besides
those completely committed to
Anwar and those who reject everything
Dr Mahathir claims, there are
many who might have been more
receptive to Dr Mahathir's
claims if not for the manner
in which he, the police and
the prosecutors have conducted
themselves. The arrests of those
closest to Anwar in UMNO as
well as ABIM and related leaders
under the Internal Security
Act have reminded everyone what
Anwar's dismissal is all
about, i.e. not sex, but power.
Just look at the Inspector General
of Police's press conference,
where he unwittingly managed
to convince those present that
Malaysia becoming a police state.
Or former Deputy Prime Minister
Ghafar's Jakarta visit,
where he managed to insult and
antagonise almost everyone there.
Or Dr Mahathir's claim
that Anwar may have deliberately
injured himself in the left
eye to gain public sympathy.
So what are the changes you see?
J:
There seems to be an irreversible
sea change going on in Malay
political culture. Most non-Malays
are watching quietly from the
sidelines, partly because they
see this as an intra-Malay affair,
and also because of the fear
of violence, bearing in mind
the May 1969 riots in KL and
the May 1998 events in Jakarta,
particularly traumatic for the
ethnic Chinese. Their fear is
that desperate politicians may
chose to play the ethnic card,
the traditional card of first
choice in Malaysian politics.
Among Malays, even before Anwar
was sacked, you have quiet,
but widespread sympathy for
jailed DAP Deputy Secretary
General and Member of Parliament
Lim Guan Eng. Not necessarily
support for the DAP, but tremendous
unease at the great injustice
involved in jailing an opposition
politician for championing the
cause of an under-aged girl
who had been (statutorily) raped
and her helpless grandmother,
while the man widely believed
to be responsible toured the
country to speak in rallies
supporting the Prime Minister.
Where will all this go?
It's
still difficult to say. But
Anwar's dismissal and
its aftermath have only further
undermined Malay public confidence
in the regime and the leader,
greatly increasing the number
of Malays ‘who can say
no', opening up a new
conjuncture in Malaysian politics.
Anwar's forces have no
choice but to build a broad
coalition with existing opposition
forces in which they hope to
and should play a leading role.
With limited and deteriorating
public confidence in the judicial
system and process, the increasingly
shared belief is that only an
electoral victory from their
combined strength can reverse
Anwar's expected fate.
That is still very much an uphill
task.
But the unexpected developments
and accompanying effervescence
are also forcing ordinary people
to think of alternatives, of
reform, of new institutions
for the creation and sustenance
of a more decent and just society
rid of the dominance of political
business, money politics and
related depravities. Beyond
Mahathir versus Anwar, the legitimacy
of many official institutions
and public faith in them, especially
among Malays, has been shaken
as never before. But contrary
to some pronouncements, this
is unlikely to descend into
anarchy, but rather, is leading
to greater demands for democracy
and accountability, though not
necessarily in that language
or idiom.
While the reform movement may
fail, Malaysian politics and
political culture will never
be the same again.
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